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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. , 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, ] 
Appellee. ) 
Case No. 20000274-CA 
Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which set aside 
entry of a foreign judgment entered by the Fort Peck Sioux and 
Assiniboine Tribal Court on October 16, 1998, and denied 
enforcement of foreign judgment. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNO. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) and Rule 3 of the UTAH R. APP. P. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this case are: 
I. Did the trial court err when it concluded that the October 
16, 1999 Tribal Court Order was unenforceable because it "relates 
to and stems from" the May 22, 1998 Order? This issue presents a 
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question of law that does not require deference to the trial 
court. Marquiles By and Through Marquiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 
1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985). The final order was decided after 
Motions and Memoranda were filed and upon the record. This issue 
was sufficiently pled and preserved in said Motions and Memoranda 
at R. at 2-18, 19-74, 208-321, & 326-424. 
II. Did the trial court err in setting aside the Entry of the 
Foreign Judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? This issue presents a question of law that does not 
require deference to the trial court. Marquiles By and Through 
Marauiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985). This 
issue was sufficiently pled and preserved in said Motions and 
Memoranda at R. at 208-321 & 326-424 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Appellant believes the following statutes and constitutional 
provisions are determinative of this appeal. 
Statutory Provisions 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-22a-l et. seg. (1999) 
Rules of Procedure 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS 
Overview: 
An action was commenced on June 15, 1999 in the Utah Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County to enforce two foreign 
judgments, to wit: (1) A Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree (herein "Custody Decree") entered on October 16, 1998; and 
(2) An Order on an Order to Show Cause Hearing (herein "Contempt 
Order") entered on November 23, 1998. Both orders stem from a 
proceeding in the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court 
(herein after "Tribal Court"). The Honorable Judge Leslie A. 
Lewis presided over the Third District Court matter from which 
this appeal arises. 
The Custody Decree was entered on a default judgment against 
Appellees due to their failure to answer a Petition for Sole 
Custody filed by Appellant. The Petition for Sole Custody was 
filed in the Tribal Court on or about the 8th day of September, 
1998. The Contempt Order was entered after an Order to Show 
Cause Hearing in which: (1) Appellees failed to appear at the 
hearing after having been served both personally and through 
their counsel with notice of the hearing; and (2) Evidence was 
offered by Appellant to support the contempt determination by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The District Court entered an 
Entry of Judgment on August 25, 1999 to assist Appellant in the 
enforcement of the judgments. The Request for Entry of Judgment 
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was filed subsequent to the expiration of the thirty day time 
period required under UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-3 (1999). The trial 
court set aside the August 25, 1999 Entry of Judgment and denied 
enforcement of the foreign judgment. 
Background: 
1. In February of 1998, Appellees commenced an action in 
the State of Utah, Third District Juvenile Court, seeking to 
terminate the parental rights of Appellant. Appellees also filed 
an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Custody. On March 3, 1998, the 
Third District Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. Johansson presiding, 
granted the Ex Parte Motion and entered an Ex Parte Order of 
Temporary Custody. In mid-March of 1998, Appellant filed a 
Petition to Transfer Jurisdiction over the matter to the Fort 
Peck Tribal Court and a Petition to Invalidate the Ex Parte Order 
of Temporary Custody. See R. at 2-14, 48-51. 
2. On May 15, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court, 
Judge Olof A. Johansson presiding, issued an order transferring 
jurisdiction over the matter to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. On 
May 22, 1998, the Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted Jurisdiction 
and ordered that the minor child who was the subject of the 
termination action be taken to the reservation and temporary 
custody placed with Appellant. Appellant filed a Petition for 
Writ of Assistance action in the Third District Court in Utah for 
enforcement of the May 22, 1998 order. On June 8, 1998, after a 
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hearing involving both court's judges and all counsel involved, 
the Third District Juvenile Court and the Fort Peck Tribal Court 
issued orders staying the proceedings pending review by a higher 
court. See R. at 2-14, 48-51. In mid to late June of 1998, 
Appellant filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
On September 1, 1998, this Court issued an order stating: 
The juvenile court transferred jurisdiction 
over issues concerning the minor, C.S., to 
the Fort Peck Tribal Court and the tribal 
court accepted jurisdiction over the matter, 
including jurisdiction over custody issues. 
Since the juvenile court no longer had 
jurisdiction over the matter after the tribal 
court accepted jurisdiction, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the petition for extra ordinary 
relief is hereby granted, the matter is 
deemed transferred to the tribal court, and 
any orders issued by the juvenile court after 
May 22, 1998, are hereby vacated. See R. at 
2-14, 48-51. 
3. On September 8, 1998, Appellant filed a petition for 
custody in the Tribal Court and Appellant caused Appellees to be 
served by depositing a copy of the petition in the U.S. Mail and 
sending it to Appellees' counsel. On September 9, 1998, pursuant 
to a voluntary dismissal by Appellees and a stipulation thereto 
by Appellant, the Fort Peck Tribal Court entered an order 
dismissing the termination of parental rights action. The order 
continued the May 22, 1998 order transferring temporary custody 
to Appellant. See R. at 2-14, 48-51. 
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4. On October 16, 1998, the tribal court entered a default 
judgment against Appellee on petition for custody and Appellant 
caused Appellees to be served by depositing a copy of the 
petition in the U.S. Mail and sending it to Appellees' counsel. 
On November 2, 1998, a Motion for Order to Show Cause with 
supporting affidavit was filed with the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
The Court issued an Order on November 2, 1998 directing that a 
hearing be held and that Appellees appear at the hearing on 
November 19, 1998. The Motion and Order were served upon 
Appellees and upon their counsel by U.S. Mail A hearing was held 
on November 19, 1998 and Appellees failed to appear at the 
hearing. An order was issued on the November 23, 1998 hearing 
and was served upon Appellees and their Counsel by U.S. Mail on 
November 24, 1998. See R. at 2-14, 48-51. 
5. No appeals have been taken of any of the orders issued 
by the Fort Peck Tribal Court. On March 8, 1998, Judge Hanson 
refused to give full faith and credit and enforce the May 22, 
1998 tribal court order because at the time of the transfer of 
custody, Appellees were not given a hearing in which they could 
oppose the transfer of custody, thereby, in Judge Hanson's view, 
denying Appellees due process and dismissed the matter. See R. 
at 2-14, 48-51. Judge Hanson's ruling specifically provided that 
his ruling did not affect a foreign judgment action on subsequent 
tribal court rulings. See R. at 2-14, 48-51, 177. 
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6. This matter was commenced on June 15, 1999 under the 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act. See R. at 2-14. On July 15, 1999, 30 
days had passed without the filing of a Motion to Stay as 
Required by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. See R. at 66-67. 
An Application for Entry of Judgment was filed on August 13, 
1999. See R. at 66-67. An Entry of Judgment was entered on 
August 25, 1999 recognizing the October 16, 1998 Custody Decree. 
See R. at 68-74. 
7. On November 16, 1999, Appellee filed a Motion to Set 
Aside the August 25, 1999 Entry of Judgment.1 See R. at 153-207. 
A temporary stay was issued on November 23, 1999. See R. at 324. 
A Response to the Motion to Set Aside was filed by Appellant on 
December 1, 1999. See R. at 326-424. The Court issued a ruling 
on February 7, 2000. See R. at 611-615. An order was issued 
on the Court's ruling on February 25, 2000. See R. at 620-624. 
This appeal followed. 
The Third District Court's Findings: 
The trial court made the following Findings of Fact: 
1. Petitioner Jayni Searle (hereafter 
"Petitioner") filed a petition for Writ of Assistance 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Case No. 98-090-5344, In the Matter of 
Chad Searle, a Minor Indian Child, seeking to enforce a 
May 22, 1998, Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order that 
1
 The Motion also sought to address other issues which 
are not pertinent to this appeal. 
7 
transferred custody from Respondent Boyd Searle 
(hereafter "Respondent") to the Petitioner. The 
petition sought recognition of the May 22nd Order as a 
foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
2. Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the petition 
on the basis that since Respondent was not given an 
opportunity to be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the 
Order was not entitled to full faith and credit. 
3. Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition 
before this Court to enforce an October 16, 1998 Fort 
Peck Tribal Court Order's Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree, finding that Respondents had 
"wrongfully maintained custody in contravention...of 
[the] Court's order of May 22, 1998." 
4. On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an 
Order entitled "Entry of Judgment" which purported to 
give full faith and credit to the October 16th Tribal 
Court Decree... SEE R. AT 620-21. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Enforcement of the Tribal Court Order: The trial court erred 
when it concluded that the Custody Order was unenforceable. The 
trial court based its ruling on its conclusion that the October 
16, 1998 Custody Order "relates to and stems from" the Temporary 
Order of May 22, 1998. This legal conclusion does not reflect 
the Utah Court's long standing view of enforcement of foreign 
judgment actions. The Court's conclusion does not address 
factual determination regarding finality and validity as required 
by the Estate of Jones standard. The conclusion does not reflect 
any viable standard under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
Accordingly, it is an erroneous ruling and should be vacated 
because the judgment satisfies both the finality and validity 
standards. 
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Rule 60(b) Motion : The trial court erred in granting 
Appellees' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the August 25, 1998 
Entry of the Foreign Judgment. Under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure the Motion must be brought within 90 
days of the entry of the judgment. The judgment in the instant 
matter became properly entered on July 15, 1999. The Rule 60(b) 
Motion was not filed until November 15, 1999, which is beyond the 
ninety day time period or a reasonable time period. 
Additionally, Appellees failed to demonstrate any of the 
enumerated grounds for which relief could have been granted under 
Rule 60(b). 
ARGUMENT 
A. TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE ORDER WAS 
NOT ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT "RELATED TO OR STEMMED" FROM 
THE MAY 22, 1998 TEMPORARY ORDER 
i. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING AND UNDERLYING JUDGMENTS 
On or about February 7, 2000, the trial court issued a 
memorandum decision entitled "Court's Ruling," which stated as 
follows: 
...Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda 
with respect to remaining motions, the Court rules as 
state herein. Since the Motions before the Court are 
related to concerns previously brought before Judge 
Hanson, this Court provides a brief procedural history 
of that case and its connection to the present case. 
In Chad Searle, the petitioner herein filed a Writ of 
Assistance seeking to enforce a May 22, 1998, Fort Peck 
Tribal Court custody Order that transferred custody 
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from respondent Boyd Searle to petitioner. The 
Petition essentially sought recognition of the May 22nd 
Order as a foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act. Judge Hanson denied the Petition on the 
basis that since respondent Boyd Searle was not given 
an opportunity to be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the 
Order was not entitled to full faith and credit. (See 
Order of Dismissal, dated July 26, 1999). 
In this case, the petitioner is attempting to 
enforce the Tribal Court's October 16, 1998, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, finding that 
the respondents had wrongfully maintained custody in 
contravention...of [the] Court's order of May 22, 1998." 
On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an order 
entitled "Entry of Judgment" which purported to give 
full faith and credit to the October 16th Decree. The 
respondents are now seeking to set aside the August 
25th Order and the October 16th Tribal Court Decree. 
The Court rules that the October 16th Tribal Court 
Decree directly relates to and stems from an Order 
which another court has concluded to not be entitled to 
full faith and credit. Specifically, the Decree 
reinforces the May 22nd Order and reiterates that it 
"is hereby continued." The October 16th Decree is 
therefore flawed because it maintains custody of the 
minor child under an Order which was issued without 
giving respondent Boyd Searle his due process right to 
be heard. Accordingly, the October 16th Order is 
similarly not entitled to full faith and credit. The 
Motion to Set Aside is therefore [granted] in part and 
this Court's August 25th Judgment is set aside... SEE R. 
at 617-18. See Addenda "A." 
A subsequent Written Order was prepared and submitted by 
Appellee and signed by the trial judge on February 27, 2000, 
which identified the following Factual Findings from the "Court's 
Ruling:" 
1. Petitioner Jayni Searle (hereafter "Petitioner") 
filed a petition for Writ of Assistance in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Case No. 98-090-5344, In the Matter of Chad Searle, a Minor 
Indian Child, seeking to enforce a May 22, 1998, Fort Peck 
Tribal Court custody Order that transferred custody from 
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Respondent Boyd Searle ... to the Petitioner. The petition 
sought recognition of the May 22nd Order as a foreign 
judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
2. Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the petition on the 
basis that since Respondent was not given an opportunity to 
be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the Order was not entitled 
to full faith and credit. 
3. Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition before 
this Court to enforce an October 16, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal 
Court Order's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree, finding that Respondents had "wrongfully maintained 
custody in contravention...of [the] Court's order of May 22, 
1998." 
4. On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an Order 
entitled "Entry of Judgment" which purported to give full 
faith and credit to the October 16th Tribal Court Decree... 
SEE R. AT 620-21. See Addenda "B" 
The trial court entered Conclusions of Law which, based upon 
these findings, state: 
The October 16th Trial Court Decree directly relates to 
and stems from an Order which another court in Chad 
Searle has concluded not to be entitled to full faith 
and credit. Specifically, the Decree reinforces the 
May 22nd Order and reiterates that it "is hereby 
continued." The October 16th Decree is therefore 
flawed because it maintains custody of the minor child 
under an Order which was issued without giving 
Respondent Boyd Searle his due process right to be 
heard. Accordingly, the October 16th Order is 
similarly not entitled to full faith and credit, and 
the August 25th Order must be set aside. See R. at 
631. See Addenda "C." 
The foreign judgments, Judge Hanson's Letter of July 15, 
1999, and the Order of July 26, 1999 provide the evidence upon 
which the trial court could have made any finding and/or 
conclusion under Utah Foreign Judgment analysis or a full faith 
and credit analysis. 
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A. The Custody Decree from October 16, 1998 provides 
ows: 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on 
Jayni Searle's Petition for Restoration of Custody. An 
entry of, notice of, and application for default having 
been entered for Respondent's failure to answer the 
Petition in a timely manner. An Affidavit of Residence 
and Grounds having been filed by Jayni Searle. The 
Court having reviewed the file and having made its 
decision, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Chad Searle is subject to the jurisdiction of 
this Court pursuant to a ruling by Judge 
Stafne that this Court has exclude 
jurisdiction. 
2. Chad Searle is a Native American child and a 
member or eligible for membership in the Fort 
Peck Assmiboine and Sioux Tribes. 
3. Jayne Searle is a biological mother of Chad 
Searle. 
4. Temporary custody of Chad was awarded by the 
Court to Jayne Searle on May 22, 1998. 
5. The emotional father of Chad Searle died in 
February of 1998. 
6. Since then, Boyd and Dorothy Searle have 
wrongfully maintained custody in 
contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) And this Court's 
order of May 22, 1998. 
7. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are the emotional 
grandparents and currently have physical 
custody despite the Court's order. 
8. Boyd and Dorothy Searle have petitioned 
the court to dismiss the termination 
action pending in tribal court. See 
Attached exhibit #1. 
9. Jayne Searle is a person fit to assume 
custody on the afore-mentioned child. 
10. Jayne Searle and Chad Searle enjoy the 
relationship of mother and child. 
11. Jayne Searle and Chad Searle have a 
normal parent-child bond which has been 
drastically impacted by the emotional 
grandparents. 
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BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court hereby enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The matter is properly before the Court 
pursuant to tribal code. 
2. Jayne and Chad Searle are members or eligible 
for membership in the Fort Peck Assiniboine 
and Sioux Tribes. 
3. Jayne Searle is domiciled on the reservation. 
4. Chad Searle, pursuant to law and tribal 
custom, became domiciled on the reservation 
due to the death of his physical custodian 
and emotional father, Boyd Carl Searle. 
5. Jayne Searle is a fit and appropriate person 
who should be awarded custody. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters the 
following: 
DECREE AND ORDER 
1. Chad Searle is hereby placed in the permanent 
custody, care, and control of Jayne Searle, 
his natural and biological mother. 
2. The previous order requiring transfer of Chad 
Searle to the reservation is hereby 
continued. 
3. Law enforcement is hereby directed to remove 
the child and return him to the reservation. 
SEE R. at 2-4 & Addenda "D." 
B. The Contempt Order from November 23, 1998 which 
provides as follows: 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court 
for hearing on an Order to Show Cause on the 19*r Day 
of November, 1998. Present for the hearing was Jayni 
Searle. The Court notes that Boyd and Dorothy Searle 
were personally served with notice of the hearing and 
the Order to Show Cause by certified, return receipt, 
U.S. mail. The Court notes further that counsel for 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, was 
served by certified, return receipt, U.S. mail. The 
Court, having heard testimony from Jayni Searle and 
argument and having fully reviewed the file, enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
13 
1. Chad Searle is an Indian child as defined in the 
Indian Child Welfare Act. 
2. Jayni Searle is an Indian parent as defined in the 
Indian Child Welfare Act. 
3. Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation. 
4. Boyd Carl Searle was Chad Searle's emotional 
father, having been deemed so by his own admission 
in a divorce action in the Third District Court. 
5. On February 1998, Boyd Carl Searle died. 
6. Chad Searle was in the custody of his emotional 
father, Boyd Carl Searle, when the emotional 
father died. 
7. The emotional grandparents, Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle filed a Petition to Terminate Parental 
Rights of Jayni Searle in the Third District Court 
in Salt Lake County for the State of Utah. 
8. On March 3, 1998, Boyd and Dorothy Searle obtained 
temporary custody of Chad through order of the 
Third District Juvenile Court of Utah. 
9. Boyd and Dorothy Searle also filed a Petition for 
Protective Order. 
10. Subsequent to that order, Jayni Searle retained 
private counsel, Mr. Jim C. Shirley of Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
11. Mr. Shirley obtained a copy of the March 3, 1998 
order. He subsequently received copies of the 
other documents. This transpired after the order 
of temporary custody was entered by the [juvenile 
court. Boyd and Dorothy Searle did not serve 
Jayni Searle or the Fort Peck Tribes with Notice 
prior to obtaining the temporary custody order in 
juvenile court or the protective order in district 
court. 
12. The Petition for Protective Order was certified 
from Utah's Third District Court to Utah's Third 
District Juvenile Court. 
13. Mr. Shirley sent courtesy copies of the pleadings 
to Mr. Gary Beaudry, counsel for the Fort Peck 
Tribes. Prior to receipt of these courtesy 
copies, the tribe had not been notified of the 
proceedings as required by I.C.W.A. 
14. Ms. Searle filed a Petition to transfer the 
proceedings to tribal court under 25 U.S.C. 
1911(b) in the juvenile court, alleging concurrent 
jurisdiction. 
15. Ms. Searle subsequently filed an Amended Petition 
to transfer under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) in the 
juvenile court, alleging exclusive jurisdiction. 
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Ms. Searle filed a Petition to invalidate the 
improperly entered custody order, citing to 25 
U.S.C. 1914 and alleging violations of 1912(a, d, 
& e) . 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Response to the 
Amended Petition to Transfer, alleging that 
domicile had not changed at the death of the 
emotional father and that Jayni Searle abandoned 
the child, Chad Searle. 
Ms. Searle filed a Reply which cited to case law 
which demonstrated that under common law domicile 
did change at the death of a custodian to the 
surviving natural parent and which alleged grounds 
to demonstrate that Ms. Searle had not abandoned 
the child. 
On May 15, 1998, the Third District Juvenile 
Court, in and for the state of Utah issued an 
order transferring jurisdiction to the tribal 
court. 
On May 22, 1998, this Court found that it has 
exclusive jurisdiction and accepted jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the Court invalidated the previous 
order granting custody to Boyd and Dorothy Searle 
and ordered that the child be brought back to the 
reservation and placed in the temporary custody of 
the natural mother. 
On the 3rd Day of June, 1998, the Third District 
Juvenile Court entered an order staying its May 
15, 1998 order. 
On June 8, 1998, the tribal and juvenile courts 
issued stays of the proceedings pending hearing 
before an appeals or federal court on the issue of 
whether the juvenile court had any jurisdiction to 
enter such an order. 
Ms. Searle caused to be filed an appeal in the 
Court of Appeals in and for Utah. 
On August 31, 1998, counsel for Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle signed a voluntary dismissal of the 
Petition to Terminate. 
On the 1st Day of September, 1998, the Court of 
Appeals found that the Juvenile Court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter any orders. 
On the 8th Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle 
filed a Petition for Sole Custody. 
Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria 
Santana, was served with this Petition for Sole 
Custody. 
On the 9th Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle 
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filed a Stipulation to Dismiss Action Brought by 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle. 
29. On the 9th Day of September, 1998, the Court 
granted Boyd and Dorothy Searle's voluntary 
dismissal but specifically ordered that "the 
previous order of temporary custody entered by 
this Court on May 22, 1998, is hereby continued 
with Jayni Searle." 
30. Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served 
with the stipulation and the order. 
31. Jayni Searle subsequently filed a Notice of Entry 
of Default, Entry of Default, and Application for 
Entry of Default. All these documents were served 
on counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria 
Christina Santana, by U.S. Mail. 
32. The Court entered a default and entered Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree. The 
decree was served on counsel for Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. Mail. 
33. Jayni Searle subsequently filed a Corrected Notice 
of Entry of Default, Corrected Entry of Default, 
and Corrected Application for Entry of Default. 
All these documents were served on counsel for 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, 
by U.S. Mail. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court hereby enters its: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Chad Searle is an Indian Child as defined by the 
Indian Child Welfare Act. 
2. The Court previously entered a finding and 
conclusion of exclusive jurisdiction under 25 
U.S.C. 1911(a) based upon the fact that upon the 
death of the custodian/emotional father, domicile 
of Chad Searle became that of his mother pursuant 
to tribal custom and well-established common law. 
The Court previously rejected Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle's contentions as meritless. 
3. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the 
issues of custody and contempt before it. The 
Indian Child Welfare Act applies to the case at 
hand. Tribal court, is the proper forum for any 
litigation involving the custody of an Indian 
child which is not the result of a divorce action 
or delinquency matter. The Court obtained 
jurisdiction originally due to the transfer of the 
litigation involving the Petition to Terminate 
Parental Rights. At the time the Petition to 
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Terminate Parental Rights was withdrawn, the Court 
retained jurisdiction due to a pending Petition 
for Sole Custody filed by Jayni Searle which was 
filed prior to the stipulation allowing dismissal. 
The Court continues to enjoy exclusive 
jurisdiction. The Court has original jurisdiction 
over the custody matter involving Chad Searle due 
to the filing of the Petition for Sole Custody. 
Jurisdiction has never been terminated by the 
Court as contended by the emotional grandparents, 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle. 
The Court has personal jurisdiction over Jayni 
Searle and Chad Searle as domiciliaries of the 
reservation pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare 
Act. 
The court has personal jurisdiction over Boyd and 
Dorothy Searle that was acquired when litigation 
involving the termination of parental right action 
was transferred to Tribal Court. See 92 Corpus 
Juris Secundum, Venue § 207 (the court receiving 
the transfer of jurisdiction/venue "thereby 
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter, all 
the parties thereto, and all matters incident 
thereto, and it may inquire into matters connected 
with the subject matter of the action"). 
Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction due to 
emotional grandparents' voluntary filing of 
pleadings before the Court. The Rules of Tribal 
Procedure require that the party file a special 
and limited appearance if they do not to wish to 
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the 
tribal court. Boyd and Dorothy Searle failed to 
file any special and limited appearance as 
required. 
Jayni Searle having satisfied her burden by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
a. Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served with a true 
and correct copy of the Order to Show Cause; 
b. Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully 
failed to comply with the Court's order to appear 
and produce the child; 
c. Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully 
failed to comply with the Court's May 22, 1998 
order to surrender physical custody of the child; 
and 
d. that Boyd and Dorothy Searle had the capacity to 
comply with the Court's orders. 
BASED upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the 
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Court hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are hereby held in 
contempt of Court; 
2. The Court will stay the jail time if and when Boyd 
and Dorothy Searle agree to bring Chad to the 
reservation as previously ordered; 
3. A bench warrant is issued for the immediate 
detention and transport of Boyd and Dorothy Searle 
to jail; 
4. The Court will lift the Bench Warrant if and when 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle contact the court, agree 
to return the child to the reservation, and make 
suitable arrangements for the transport of Chad 
Searle to the reservation; 
5. A bench warrant is issued for the immediate 
detention and transport of Chad Searle to the 
reservation; 
6. The Court will lift the Bench Warrant upon Chad 
Searle's return to the custody of his mother; 
7. Boyd and Dorothy Searle be required to reimburse 
the tribe for costs incurred in the Fort Peck 
Tribe's effort to secure the release and return of 
Chad Searle to the reservation; 
8. The Fort Peck Tribes are ordered to provide the 
Court with a specific amount; 
9. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are ordered to pay Jayni 
Searle for reasonable attorneys fees incurred; and 
10. Jayni Searle is instructed to secure a list of 
attorneys fees incurred. See R. at 5-12 & 
Addenda "E. 99 
C. Judge Hanson's July 26, 1999 Order of Dismissal 
provides the following: 
The above-entitled action is dismissed without 
prejudice as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 
22, 1998 Order which has been entered by the Fort Peck 
Tribal court and the dismissal of this action in no way 
precludes subsequent enforcement of subsequent Orders 
through a filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, 
and which are otherwise enforceable under law. See R. 
at & Addenda "F." 
D. Judge Hanson's July 15, 1999 Letter provides the 
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following language: 
With regard to the complaints of Ms. Santana that Mr. 
Shirley has brought this matter before Judge Lewis, 
please be advised that I do not find any impropriety in 
that regard, as it was my intention to only address the 
May 22, 1198 Order and the Writ of Assistance that was 
requested based thereon. 
If any subsequent Order has been properly 
domesticated under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and is 
otherwise enforceable, I am confident that Judge Lewis, 
who apparently is assigned to the case, will handle the 
matter in accordance with the facts as she finds them 
and in accordance with the law. See 378-379, & Addenda 
i i . ANALYSIS OF THE ERROR IN THE CONCLUSION OF LAW 
(1) Court Incorrectly Entered a Conclusion Based Upon the 
Evidence 
The primary evidence before the Courts were the foreign 
judgments, Judge Hanson's July 15, 1999 letter, and the Judge 
Hanson's ruling on the May 22, 1998 Order. The Court incorrectly 
concluded that the October 16, 1998 Custody Decree was 
unenforceable because it "related to and stemmed from" the May 
22, 1998 Temporary Order of Custody which Judge Hanson refused to 
enforce.2 As the Findings of Fact indicate, the Tribal Court did 
in fact: (1) Find that "temporary custody ... was awarded ... on May 
22, 1998," and that Appellees had "wrongfully maintained custody 
2
 It should be noted that the July 26, 1999 Order of Dismissal issued by Judge 
Hanson is on appeal before this Court. For purposes of this appeal, it will be assumed that Judge 
Hanson's ruling was correct. However, should this Court conclude otherwise, the underlying 
ruling would accordingly fail as a matter of fact and law. 
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in contravention... [the Tribal] Court's order of May 22, 1998;" 
and (2) Order that "the previous order3 requiring transfer of 
Chad Searle to the reservation is hereby continued." However, 
the trial court's conclusion, based upon these findings and 
order, that the Custody Decree stemmed from the May 22, 1998 
Order is not supported by the facts in the record. 
The evidence presented below indicates that the trial 
court's conclusion fails to factor in the entire gambit of 
language in the Findings, Conclusions, and Order from October 16, 
1998. The October 16, 1998 Custody Decree clearly states that the 
"matter came before the Court on Jayni Searle's Petition for 
Restoration of Custody." Emphasis added. Furthermore, the 
Custody Decree clearly states that "an entry of, notice of, and 
application for default [were! entered for Respondent's failure 
to answer the Petition in a timely manner." Emphasis added. The 
Tribal Court found that Appellant "is a person fit to assume 
custody,'' Appellant and the child "enjoy the relationship of 
mother and child," and other findings pertaining to a permanent 
order of custody. The Court went on to conclude that "Jayni 
3
 It is not clear from the tribal court ruling whether it 
was referring to the May 22, 1998 Order at this point or the 
September 9, 1998 Order which continued its previous orders. The 
September 9, 1998 Order was in response to Appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss their termination of parental rights action in tribal 
court. It ordered that Respondent's return the child also, but 
came after Appellees had an opportunity to appeal the May 22, 
1998 Order. 
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Searle is a fit and appropriate person who should be awarded 
custody." The Court also ordered that "Chad Searle is hereby 
placed in the permanent custody, care, and control of Jayni 
Searle, his natural and biological mother." 
While the Court did continue its previous order from May 22, 
1998, this was done in connection with the grant of permanent 
custody. The Tribal Court clearly indicates October 16, 1998 
Custody Decree resulted from a default judgment on Appellant's 
Tribal Court Petition for Custody. The Custody Decree only 
related to the May 22, 1998 Order because the May 22, 1998 Order 
was a temporary order in the same action. Under the Doctrine of 
Merger, the temporary order of custody would merge into the 
permanent order of custody. See Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. 
Crook, 6 P.3d 1143 (Utah App. 2000) (under Doctrine of Merger, 
TRO merges into preliminary injunction). The final order is the 
order reviewed for any defects because the temporary order is 
merged into the final order. See Birch Creek Irrigation v. 
Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993) (Court noted "had the trial 
court reached a final Judgment granting or denying a permanent 
injunction, we would dismiss that portion of the appeal 
challenging the temporary restraining order under the doctrine of 
merger.")4 In the instant matter the final order was valid and 
4
 Under the case law of certain jurisdictions, Appellant 
would have lost her ability to continue to fight the May 22, 1998 
Order under the Doctrine of Merger because it would have been 
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final as demonstrate infra and should not be denied enforcement 
because Judge Hanson found deficiencies in a temporary order. 
The trial judge determined that the defect in a temporary 
order rendered invalid a subsequent final order because it 
continued the previously entered order. This conclusion was 
incorrect. A subsequent order is valid regardless of whether the 
prior order was erroneous. Crowther v. District Court of Salt 
Lake County, 54 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 1936) . The following 
argument in this respect was provided to the trial court and is 
incorporated here by reference: 
Utah Courts have held that a contempt order is valid, even 
if the underlying order is erroneously entered. Crowther v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County, 54 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 
1936) ("disobedience of an order made by a court within its 
jurisdiction and power is contempt, although the order may 
be clearly erroneous"). Other jurisdictions have also 
addressed this issue and have held: 
Consequently, the authorities are in accord that 
where the court has jurisdiction of the parties 
and of the subject matter of the suit and the 
legal authority to make the order5, a party 
refusing to obey it, however erroneously made, is 
liable for contempt. Such order, though 
erroneous, is lawful within the meaning of 
contempt statutes until it is reversed by an 
appellate court...the fact that a witness may 
disagree with the Court on the propriety of its 
ruling is, of course, no excuse for his not 
complying with it. The proper method of 
challenging the correctness of an adverse ruling 
is by an appeal and not by disobedience. Deskins 
lost if it was not specifically mentioned in the final order. 
See Brooks v. Brooks 689 N.E.2d 987 (Ohio App. 1996). 
5
 This standard is consistent with the Estate of Jones 
Standard for enforcement of a foreign judgment. 
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v. Waldt, 499 P.2d 206 (Wash. 1972) (emphasis 
added); citing to Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490 
(Wash. 1968) and Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 
Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943). SEE R. AT 54-55. 
A person can clearly be held in contempt for 
noncompliance to an order which may be later determined to 
have been erroneous. The underlying principle should be the 
same with other subsequent orders which are properly entered 
in accordance with due process. 
As discussed infra, the Tribal Court had jurisdiction 
over parties and the subject matter. Accordingly, unless 
there is a showing under the standard pronounced in Estate 
of Jones 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993) that the order is 
lacks validity and/or finality unenforceable, the order 
should be enforced. There were no findings under the 
Estate of Jones standard or any facts/conclusions which 
remotely relate to the standard. Therefore, the trial 
court erred in its conclusion.6 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules 
4-6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly indicate the 
policy behind the bright line distinction between final and 
temporary/interlocutory orders. The clear basis for this 
distinction is that interlocutory orders may be modified by the 
trial court during the course of the litigation. In custody 
matters (as the tribal court matter was), the distinction is even 
more evident because the party who is awarded temporary custody 
might not be awarded sole custody in the final order. It would 
stand to reason that even if an error or defect in a Utah 
District Court temporary custody order existed, the error would 
be of no consequence and cured if the final order did not result 
from the same defect. This is the very standard under the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act. 
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Additionally, the Court's conclusion is not supported 
by the evidence. Several facts exist and are undisputed 
which bolster the fact that the final order was valid and 
did not suffer from the same infirmities identified by Judge 
Hanson in his ruling on the enforceability of the Tribal 
Court's May 22, 1998 Order. These factors include, but are 
not limited to, the following: (1) The temporary order was 
in place for more than four months (just shy of five months) 
prior to the final Custody Decree being issued (May 22, 1998 
to October 16, 1998) See R. at 2-14, 48-51; (2) A stay had 
been issued on June 8, 1998 by the Tribal Court allowing 
Appellees to appeal its May 22, 1998 Order See R. at 2-14, 
48-51; (3) Appellees through their counsel were served with 
a Petition for Sole Custody on September 8, 1998 See R. at 
2-14, 48-51; (4) Appellees failed to respond to Appellant's 
Petition and a default was obtained (leading to the October 
16, 1998 Custody Decree) See R. at 2-14, 48-51; (5) The 
October 16, 1998 Custody Decree gave Appellant permanent 
sole legal and physical custody of her child See R. at 2-14, 
48-51; and (6) The May 22, 1998 Order had previously been 
continued on September 9, 1998 with no object from Appellees 
See R. at 2-14, 48-51. 
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Appellant was entitled to sole custody based upon the 
issuance of a permanent custody order on October 16, 1998. 
Appellant had the sole right to determine where the child 
lived. The Court's order only reinforced her right to 
determine that the child reside with her on the reservation. 
Unlike the temporary order where the Tribal Court still had 
a say in the placement decisions. That decision was and is 
now solely in the hands of Appellant. 
Based upon the foregoing, the October 16, 1998 Custody 
Decree is not invalid merely because it merged a temporary 
order that required the child be returned to the 
reservation. Appellant prevailed based upon Appellees' 
default. Notice was the alleged defect in the May 22, 1998 
Order. Such a defect did not exist in the October 16, 1998 
Custody Decree. Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion 
is erroneous. 
(2) The Trial Court did not Address The Foreign 
Judgment Standard For Enforcement 
The trial court did not address the core issues in 
determining the validity and finality of the October 16, 
1998 Custody Order in making its determination that the 
Custody Order was not enforceable. In addressing this issue 
to the trial court, Appellant set forth the law in this 
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d. Appellant adopts by reference that argument and 
it forth word for word as follows: 
1. General Principles 
To determine if the order is enforceable, the 
Court should look to see if the tribal court order 
was valid and final. See Estate of Jones, Matter of, 
858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993) (If the judgment meets 
the validity and finality criteria, "it is entitled 
to full faith and credit"' and is enforceable under 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act). This Court should 
enforce the tribal court order of October 16, 1998 
because it is both valid and final as set forth 
below. 
1. Validity 
"In order to be *valid' for purposes of full 
faith and credit, a judgment must have been rendered 
by a court with competent jurisdiction and in 
compliance with the constitutional requirements of 
due process." Estate of Jones, Matter of, 858 P.2d 
983, 985 (Utah 1993). As more fully argued below, 
Respondents have failed to show either element in 
that the judgment was rendered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction after extensive pleadings 
being filed and is final for purposes of the analysis 
under the foreign judgment act. 
A. Competent Jurisdiction 
The original action involving Petitioner's 
custodial rights was commenced in the Third District 
Juvenile Court of Utah in and for Salt Lake County. 
Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, jurisdiction over the juvenile court 
matter was transferred to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
The tribal court obtained exclusive jurisdiction to 
any state court. Petitioner filed a petition to 
restore sole custody. Subsequently, the tribal court 
dismissed the contested action which Respondents had 
commenced in [the Third District Juvenile Court]. The 
tribal court dismissed the termination action but 
retained jurisdiction over the custody issues and 
specifically continued the previous order that the 
child be returned to the reservation and to 
Petitioner's custody. The custody issues were 
subsequently decided in favor of Petitioner upon a 
default judgment. Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 
the tribal court was the proper forum to resolve the 
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temporary and permanent custody issues. See Adoption 
of Hallowav, Matter of, 732 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986) 
and Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 
490 U.S. 30, 52, 109 S.Ct. 1507, 1610, 104 L.Ed. 2d 
29, (1989) . 
As pointed out by the Halloway decision, the 
tribal court is the preferred forum for decisions 
involving custody of Native American children. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
the determination of custody is squarely in the 
child's tribal court's hands. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52, 109 
S.Ct. 1507, 1610, 104 L.Ed. 2d 29, (1989). 
Respondents had a chance to litigate the final custody 
issues but failed to file any pleadings in tribal 
court, resulting in a default judgment. At no time 
has the tribal court dismissed or ceded jurisdiction 
over the custody issues. Therefore, the tribal court 
was a court of competent jurisdiction. 
C. B. Due Process 
The demands of due process rest on the concept of 
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties 
involved. Holm v. Smilowitz 840 P.2d 157, 164 (Utah 
App. 1992) (quoting Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 
1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Rupp v. 
Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341, (Utah 1980)). 
"One of the fundamental requisites of due process is 
the opportunity to be fully heard" and notice. Id. 
Respondents fail to identify any way in which their 
due process rights were violated after the May 22, 
1998 order. In fact, the tribal court gave them 
nearly three months to appeal its [May 22, 1998] 
order[] while the stay was issued [on June 8, 1998]. 
However, Respondents have chosen to sit idle and 
ignore the legitimate jurisdiction of the tribal court 
with their perceived grievances regarding due process. 
Their failure does not equate to a denial of due 
process but rather a failure to act judiciously in 
protecting one's rights. The tribal court was not 
duty bound to wait for Respondents to act. 
Respondents were also placed on notice of the 
action for custody in tribal court. Despite ample 
notice and more than thirty days of opportunity to 
respond, Respondents chose not to be involve 
themselves in that process. Respondents failed to 
respond to Petitioner's Petition for Sole Custody. 
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Respondents' failure resulted in a default judgment on 
the custody petition in tribal court. Once again, 
Respondents have not filed an appeal or any 
appropriate Motion to Set Aside with the Tribal Court. 
Respondents failure to participate was of their own 
choosing and does not amount to a violation of due 
process. Given the foregoing/ there was not a 
violation of Respondents' due process rights to be 
heard and to have notice. Therefore, Respondents have 
had sufficient due process under the circumstances. 
Therefore, the order is valid as defined by applicable 
case law. 
2. Finality 
A. Estate of Jones Standard of Finality 
The finality in the context of domestication of a 
foreign order is not the same as determining the 
finality of a judgment for purposes of appeal (i.e. 
interlocutory v. appeal of right). In the Estate of 
Jones decision cited above, the Court held that the 
foreign judgment (the California judgment) was "final 
because the trial court judgment was not appealed." 
Noting that the foreign jurisdiction (California) 
provided "a specific time period in which to appeal 
from the entry of judgment," the Court found that the 
litigant had failed to appear or participate in the 
foreign litigation, including a failure to even 
"attempt to appeal the judgment." Id. at 98 6. 
This Court of Appeals interpretation is entirely 
consistent with the other provisions of the Foreign 
Judgment Act....These provisions allow for time to file 
an appeal or to stay the enforcement if an appeal is 
pending. Under this analysis, the judgment is final 
in that Respondents failed to participate in the 
underlying litigation or challenge the tribal court's 
order in any manner (i.e. filing an objection or even 
a request for hearing). The time for filing an appeal 
has ran and the order is therefore final for purpose 
of this analysis. 
The applicable provisions of the Fort Peck Tribal 
Court Rules of Appellate Procedure differ 
significantly from the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The orders which are appealable/final are 
those which "involves an issue of law consistent with 
a violation of due process adversely affecting the 
outcome of a trial on the merits, regardless of 
whether the final order includes a full determination 
on the merits." See Rule 6 of Fort Peck Rules of 
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Appellate Procedure (emphasis added). Therefore, the 
October 15, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court Order granting 
custody to Petitioner ...was final under the laws of the 
state of rendition as required under the finality 
prong. Having established both prongs, the order 
should be given full faith and credit and enforced by 
Utah Courts. 
E. D. Validity and Enforceability — November 
23, 1998 Order 
Under the analysis set forth above regarding the 
Estate of Jones standards, the November 23, 1998 order 
regarding the order of custody is enforceable in Utah. 
While Respondent's claim that the order is merely an 
extension of the previous May 22, 1998 order, this is 
inaccurate. Respondents had more than six months to 
appeal the May 22, 1998 order or seek to block its 
enforcement through the process afforded them by the 
tribal court and its appellate division (and even 
probably the Federal Court System). Appellants failed 
to do so. Additionally, the case law cited to above 
clearly stands for the proposition that the order is 
valid because a person is under a duty to comply with 
an order until it is modified by a court having 
appellate jurisdiction over the court of rendition. 
The May 22, 1998 order was never modified by the court 
of rendition or an appellate court. Therefore, the 
contempt order needs to be analyzed under the same due 
process analysis set forth above. 
First, the order was rendered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction as set forth above. Second, 
Petitioners were served with notice of the order to 
show cause, were given an opportunity to appear and 
defend, and failed to do so. Petitioners were not 
denied due process but [Respondents] simply failed to 
act.... SEE R. at 56-61. 
The finality and validity analysis was not addressed by the 
trial court. The trial court's findings are insufficient to form 
a basis upon which to deny enforcement under the relevant case 
law. The trial court did not find that the Tribal Court was not 
a court of competent jurisdiction. The trial court did not make 
any findings upon which the trial court could conclude that 
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Appellees were denied due process in the Tribal Court's entering 
a Default Judgment against Appellees. The trial court did not 
make any findings that the October 16, 1998 Custody Decree was 
not final or was the subject of an appeal. The trial court did 
not find that a stay should issue pursuant to the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act (see Utah Code Anno. § 78-22a-4). 
The Conclusion of Law that the October 16, 1998 Custody 
Decree is not entitled to full faith and credit and enforcement 
is erroneous. Further proceedings are unnecessary to address 
this issue based upon the orders themselves which on their face 
demonstrate their validity and finality. Additionally, the 
Appellees' failure to file a Motion to Stay within thirty days of 
the filing of the Foreign Judgment Action is a factor the Court 
should have weighed in Appellant's favor. This Court should 
issue an order directing that the Third District Court forthwith 
issue an order directing law enforcement to immediately enforce 
the October 16, 1998 Custody Decree. 
B. THE COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED THE RULE 60(B) MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE THE AUGUST 25, 1999 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
i. Timeliness 
The underlying action was a foreign judgment action 
commenced pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 78-22a-l et. seg. (1953 
as amended). The Utah Foreign Judgment Act provides that no 
enforcement shall take place within thirty days. See Utah Code 
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Anno- §78-22a-3 (3) (1953 as amended). In order to stay 
enforcement of a foreign judgment, the judgment debtor must file 
a Motion for Stay or provide proof that a stay is in effect. See 
Utah Code Anno. §78-22a-4 (1953 as amended). Utah Code Anno. § 
78-22a-5(l) provides that the "foreign judgment filed under this 
chapter becomes a lien as provided in Section 78-22a-l if a stay 
of execution has not been granted." Utah Code Anno. §78-22-1 (b) 
(1953 as amended) provides that the lien becomes effective upon 
entry of judgment. 
Therefore, pursuant to the statutory framework, the foreign 
judgment is entered and given full faith and credit after thirty 
days if no Motion to Stay has been filed by the judgment debtor. 
Accordingly, the two foreign judgments obtained full faith and 
credit on July 15, 1999, thirty days after the filing on June 15, 
1999 because Appellees failed to file any Motion to Stay within 
the designated time period. Accordingly, both judgments should 
be enforced as if they were Utah Judgments entered on July 15, 
1999. 
Rule 60(b) provides the following: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding ...The motion shall 
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. 
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The Motion to Set Aside was filed by Appellees on or about 
November 15, 1999. See R. at 153. Appellees were appropriately 
served with the Foreign Judgment Action on June 15, 1999. See R. 
at 17-18. The judgment was given full faith and credit on July 
15, 1999 due to Appellees failure to file a Motion to Stay in a 
timely fashion. Appellees failed to file a Rule 60(b) Motion 
within the 90 days of July 15,1999 (Appellees filed after more 
than 120 days). Appellees had a reasonable time after 
discovering that the action had been commenced and a judgment 
could be entered as prescribed by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction and erred in granting a 
Motion to Set Aside and denying enforcement when the Judgement 
was effectively entered by law on July 15, 1999. 
ii. Appellees failed to Prove Sufficient Grounds and the 
Court Failed to Make Any Conclusion or Finding as to a 
Rule 60 (b) Ground 
The trial court failed to identify which grounds were 
applicable to the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the August 25, 
1999 Entry of Judgment. See R. at 620-623. The Judgment should 
be reversed in that Appellee's failed to demonstrate evidence 
justifying relief. Appellee's sought relief from the August 25, 
1999 Entry of Judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) and (4). See R. at 
153-207. Appellee made the following factual assertions in 
support of the Motion to Set Aside: 
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FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
1. Petitioner commenced an action before Judge 
Timothy Hanson seeking to enforce a May 22, 1998 Fort 
Peck Tribal Court order that transferred custody of a 
minor Chad Searle from Respondents to Petitioner. On 
or about March 8, 199[8], Judge Timothy Hanson convened 
a hearing and issued an oral ruling denying enforcement 
of the May 22, 199[8] trial court order. Judge Hanson 
ruled that Respondents were not afforded notice in 
violation of due process. See R. at 155. 
2. Respondent's counsel prepared a proposed order and 
served it upon counsel for Petitioner. Petitioner 
filed an objection to the order. See R. at 155. 
3. While the objection to Judge Hanson's order was 
pending, Petitioner filed a new action before this 
court requesting the court give "full faith and credit" 
to a second Fort Peck Tribal Court order (dated October 
16, 1998) which found that temporary custody was 
properly transferred by the tribal court on May 22, 
1998, that Respondent had wrongfully maintained custody 
and that based on these findings the May 22, 1998 order 
was in full force and effect and custody was 
permanently transferred. (Exhibit A). See R. at 156. 
4. Judge Hanson's oral ruling in the first case had 
not been entered as a written order at the time 
Respondent filed their response in this action opposing 
Petitioner's petition. See R. at 156. 
5. On July 26, 1999, Judge Hanson entered the Order 
of Dismissal in the first case stating that the action 
is dismissed with prejudice as to the Fort Peck Tribal 
Court May 22, 1998 Order. (Exhibit B). See R. at 156. 
6. Petitioner did not withdraw her petition seeking 
that this court enforce the other tribal court orders 
which expressly made findings that Respondent was "in 
contempt'' for not obeying the May 22, 1998 order and 
that Respondent had wrongfully maintained custody in 
contravention of...the May 22, 1998 order." Exhibit A. 
See R. at 156. 
7. On August 23, 1999, this Court entered a judgment 
giving full faith and credit to the tribal court order 
referred to above. (Exhibit C ) . See R. at 156. 
On December 1, 1999, Appellant submitted a Response in 
Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Set Aside the August 25, 1 
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Entry of Judgment. See R. 347-379. In Response, Appellant 
submitted the following factual statement: 
FACTS 
1. On or about the 15th of May, 1998, the Third District 
Juvenile Court transferred jurisdiction over issues 
involving Chad Searle to the Fort Peck Tribal Court in 
Poplar Montana. See R. at 347. 
2. On or about May 22, 1998, the Fort Peck Tribal Court 
accepted jurisdiction and awarded Jayni Searle 
temporary custody of Chad Searle, thereby vacating a 
previous ex parte order of temporary custody issued by 
the Third District Juvenile Court. See R. at 347. 
3. On or about May 27, 1998, Jayni filed a Petition for 
Writ of Assistance in the Utah Third District Court 
seeking to enforce a May 22, 1998 order entered by the 
Fort Peck Tribal Courts. The Petition was assigned to 
the Honorable Judge Timothy Hanson. See R. at 347-48. 
4. In February of 1999, Petitioner filed a Motion before 
Judge Hanson to give full faith and credit to the 
orders before this Court now. See R. at 348. 
5. On or about March 8, 1998, the District Court denied 
the Petition for Writ of Assistance finding 
specifically that the May 22, 1998 was entered by 
without due process in that Judge Hanson found that 
Respondents were not given sufficient notice. Judge 
Hanson also found that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act 
was the only way that a foreign judgment could be 
enforced. Judge Hanson's findings have subsequently 
been appealed and are before the Court of Appeals for 
review. See R. at 348, 
6. At the March 8, 1998 hearing, Judge Hanson stated that 
the order did not preclude enforcement of subsequent 
orders issued by the tribal court and he could not say 
how his colleagues would rule on those orders. Judge 
Hanson found that the October 16, 1998 and November 19, 
1998 Orders needed to be filed under the Foreign 
Judgment Act to obtain full faith and credit. See 
Exhibit B of Respondent's Memorandum in Support Motion 
to Set Aside (paragraph 9 of the findings of fact, 
paragraph 7 of the Conclusions of Law, and paragraph 3 
of the Order of the Court). See R. at 348. 
7. In March of 1999, Petitioner commenced an action to 
enforce the two orders before the Court. However, the 
documents were lost in the filing process. See R. at 
348. 
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8. When Petitioner discovered the glitch, counsel spoke 
with the Court clerks who informed him that the action 
needed to be filed again. See R. at 348. 
9. On or about June 15, 1999, Petitioner commenced an 
action for the enforcement of two foreign judgments 
(dated respectively October 16, 1998 and November 19, 
1998). The action was assigned to Judge Lewis by the 
Court. See R. at 349. 
10. On or about the 6th Day of July, 1999, Petitioner filed 
a Memorandum in Support of Entry of the Judgments 
(responding to a letter sent to the Court by 
Respondent's counsel). See Exhibit #1. See R. at 349. 
11. On or about the 9th day of August, 1999, Petitioner 
filed an Application for Entry of Judgment and an Entry 
of Judgment (the documents dealt solely with the 
October 16, 1998 order). See R. at 349. 
12. The documents were served upon Counsel for the 
Respondents by U.S. Mail. See R. at 349. 
13. On or about the 25th day of August, 1999, the trial 
court entered an "Entry of Judgment" which notified all 
that the October 16, 1998 order had been given full 
faith and credit under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
See R. at 349. 
14. On or about the 22nd day of November, 1999, Respondent 
filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and a Motion 
to Stay. See R. at 349. 
a. Rule 60(b)(3) 
Appellees made the following legal assertions with respect 
to the applicability of Rule 60(b)(3) to their Motion to Set 
Aside: 
...under subsection (3), this Court entered an Order by 
no fault of its own despite being precluded from doing 
so under the doctrine of res judicata because of 
Petitioner's misrepresentations and misconduct. As 
demonstrated in the factual allegations supporting the 
motion, Petitioner had already brought an action before 
Judge Hanson seeking to enforce the May 22, 1998 tribal 
court order. Judge Hanson dismissed the action with 
prejudice and found that the order was unenforceable 
for lack of due process. Petitioner then filed a 
second petition before this court seeking to have an 
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October 16, 1998 tribal court order enforced, which 
order had in content and effect enforced the May 22, 
1998 order that Judge Hanson found to be unenforceable. 
This action was therefore commenced in bad faith and 
the Court's entry of judgment was induced by 
Petitioner's misrepresentation and misconduct. R. at 
158. 
In Response to these allegations of misrepresentation and 
misconduct, Appellant offered the following: 
Rule 60(b)(3) provides that a Court may set aside 
a judgment if the Court determines that there was 
"fraud..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct 
of an adverse party." In support of their 
contention, Respondents allege that Petitioner 
allegedly failed to notify the Court of the action 
before Judge Hanson and that the enforcement 
action was allegedly "commenced in bad faith" 
through Petitioner's alleged "misrepresentation 
and misconduct." Respondents grossly 
misrepresent the facts to the Court. 
First, Petitioner filed the action in 
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
Petitioner provided all the facts which are 
essential under the act at the time of filing. 
Second, the Court stated to both parties' counsel 
on the record at the November 23, 1999 hearing 
that the Court had reviewed Judge Hanson's file 
prior to ruling (showing that the Court had actual 
notice of the Judge Hanson proceeding). Third, 
Petitioner filed a Memorandum with the Court which 
clearly delineated Judge Hanson's ruling and the 
history of the case. See Exhibit #1. Petitioner 
did not attempt to hide anything from the Court or 
run from Judge Hanson's ruling. Fifth, Judge 
Hanson notified the parties that he did not find 
anything inappropriate in Petitioner's filing the 
foreign judgment action on the October 16, 1998 
and November 19, 1998 Orders after Respondent sent 
a letter on June 21, 1999 raising these same 
issues and asking for sanctions. See Exhibit #2 
(Judge Hanson's Letter). At the March 8, 1999 
hearing before Judge Hanson, he stated that he 
expected that Petitioner would file the subsequent 
orders under the Foreign Judgment Act and "one of 
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his colleagues" would determine whether 
enforcement was appropriate. 
Sixth, the October 16, 1998 Order did not 
merely enforce the May 22, 1998 Order that "Judge 
Hanson found to be unenforceable." Rather, the 
October 16, 1998 Order granted a Petition for Sole 
Custody filed by Petitioner in Tribal Court and 
served upon Respondents through their counsel. 
The October 16, 1998 Order is a permanent order of 
custody resulting from Petitioner's Petition for 
Custody. The May 22, 1998 Order is an order of 
temporary custody, resulting from an ex parte 
motion for temporary custody from the Fort Peck 
Tribes. While the October 16, 1998 Order does 
reflect the procedural history of the case and 
Respondents failure to obey the order of the 
Court, the Order is based upon a default due to 
Respondents's failure to respond and file an 
answer to the Petition for Custody. 
Seventh, Respondents sent a letter to this 
Court notifying the Court of Respondents' 
concerns. Petitioner filed an objection to that 
letter. Respondents chose not to file any 
pleadings as required by the Rules and the Foreign 
Judgment Act to oppose entry of the judgment and 
enforcement of said judgment. Eighth, Respondents 
have failed to identify any specific conduct which 
is not addressed herein which would substantiate 
Respondents' claim of fraud. 
Respondents allegations of fraud are without 
merit. Petitioner has provided the Court with the 
necessary information and the Court even took the 
next step of reviewing the file from the matter 
which was before Judge Hanson. Respondents merely 
create allegations in a blatant attempt to sway 
the Court. Respondents have failed to provide the 
Court with any real evidence of fraud, 
miscommunication, or misconduct as required by 
Rule 60(b). 
This Court determined from the record that there was no real 
evidence of fraud, miscommunication, or misconduct as alleged by 
Appellees in their Motion. The trial court reviewed the record 
before Judge Hanson (Case No. 980905344), had a July 15, 1999 
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letter from Judge Hanson to counsel (See R. at 378-79), and had 
the July 26, 1999 Order of Dismissal from the matter decided by 
Judge Hanson (Case No. 980905344) (See R. at 176-78). The letter 
from Judge Hanson states: 
With regard to the complaints of Ms. Santana 
that Mr. Shirley has brought this matter before 
Judge Lewis, please be advised that I do not find 
any impropriety in that regard, as it was my 
intention to only address the May 22, 1998 Order 
and the Writ of Assistance that was requested 
based thereon. 
If any subsequent Order has been properly 
domesticated under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act 
and is otherwise enforceable, I am confident that 
Judge Lewis, who apparently is assigned to the 
case, will handle the matter in accordance with 
the facts as she finds them and in accordance with 
the law. See R. at 379. 
The July 26, 1999 Order of Dismissal provides the following: 
9. Petitioner also subsequently filed a Motion to 
give Full Faith and Credit to two subsequent Tribal 
Court Orders. See R. at 176. 
7. The subsequent Tribal Court Orders are not before 
the Court under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. See R. 
at 177. 
3. The above-entitled action is dismissed without 
prejudice as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 
22, 1998 Order which has been entered by the Fort Peck 
Tribal Court and the dismissal of this action in no way 
precludes subsequent enforcement of subsequent Orders 
through a filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, 
and which are otherwise enforceable under law. See R. 
at 177 (Emphasis added). 
Additionally, the Court was informed that Judge Hanson's 
verbal ruling indicated this same point. This issue was 
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preserved by pleading (See R. at 54) in which Appellant made the 
following proffer: 
It should also be noted that in his verbal ruling, 
Judge Hanson indicated that in order to have the 
October and November judgments recognized, Petitioner 
would have to file them in accordance with the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act. Judge Hanson also recognized 
that it might go before one of the other judges.... 
These facts make it very clear that there was no fraud, 
misrepresentation, or misconduct committed upon the Court or 
Appellees in the manner alleged by Appellees. The facts as 
alleged by Appellees did not support the relief that Appellees 
sought under Rule 60(b) (3). Judge Hanson's letter and the Third 
District Court Orders make it very clear that "Judge Hanson's" 
ruling did not preclude enforcement of the Tribal Court Orders 
which were entered subsequent to May 22, 1998. Furthermore, the 
record does not reveal that the trial court made any 
determination which even closely resembles misconduct, 
misrepresentation, or fraud upon the Court. 
The pleadings filed by Appellant to commence the underlying 
action demonstrate that they were filed appropriately in 
accordance with the Foreign Judgment Action. See R. at 1-18. 
The application and the Notice of Entry of Judgment are equally 
appropriate. See R. at 66-75. Appellees did not demonstrate an 
adequate factual basis to support this alleged ground for relief. 
This Court can determine from the record, which is all based upon 
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a Motion and Response, that the factual assertions by Appellee 
would have failed to adequately state a claim for any relief 
under Rule 60(b)(3) as a matter of law to meet the burden of 
proof. Additionally, Judge Lewis did not find any misconduct or 
fraud. 
b. Rule 60(b)(4) 
Appellees' assertions as to Rule 60(b)(4) do not rise on 
their face to the level to demonstrate that the Entry of Judgment 
was void. In order to be void the judgment must have been 
rendered without jurisdiction. Stanley Title Company v. 
Continental Bank and Trust Company 485 P.2d 1400 (Utah 1971) 
(Must show that the judgment on its face lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, lack of reasonable notice, 
incompetency of the Court, or failure to comply with requirements 
of due process). Nothing in Appellees Motion gives rise to this 
justification for a Rule 60(b) Motion because the Judgment was 
void. See R. at 151-207. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of the District Court should be reversed 
because the trial court erred in its conclusion regarding 
enforcement and erred in granting the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set 
Aside. This Court should issue an order requiring that the 
Foreign Judgments be given full faith and credit and directing 
40 
the District Court to enter such orders as are necessary to 
enforce said orders. 
Dated this 6th Day of April, 2001 
Jiiji C. Shirley 
^ Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of April, 2001, I 
mailed, first class postage prepaid, true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief to: 
Maria Santana 
Attorney for Appellants 
44 West Broadway, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Gary Beaudry 
Attorney for Fort Peck Tribes 
322 Main Street, Suite 102 
Williston, N.D. 58802-2141 
;/ o 
/ 
Jim/C. SMrky^ ^ 
Attorney for Appellant / 
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
JAYNI SEARLE, : COURT'S RULING 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 996907234 
vs. : 
BOYD SEARLE and DOROTHY SEARLE, : 
Defendants. : 
A Notice to Submit has been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with the 
respondent's Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Rule 60 Motion, 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for Declaratory Judgment. 
A hearing was held before the Court: on November 23, 1999, on the 
Emergency Motion to Stay. At that time, the Court granted the 
Motion to Stay temporarily, but deferred making a final ruling on 
the Motion until counsel for the petitioner had an opportunity to 
respond to the Motion and the Court had an opportunity to review 
the case of In the Matter of Chad Searle. a Minor Indian Child. 
Case No. 980905344, Judge Timorhy Hanson presiding. The petitioner 
is now seeking a ruling on the Motion to Stay and the Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment. The petitioner has also filed a Notice of Request 
for Delay of Decision with respect: to *che respondent's Motion for 
Declaratory Judgment. In her Notice, the petitioner requests that 
noRiq 
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the Court defer ruling on the Motion for Declaratory Judgment until 
the Court has rendered a decision on the petitioner's pending 
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. Finally, the petitioner requests a 
hearing on the Motion for Dpclaratory Judgment "if the Court is 
inclined to grant the Motion." 
The Court determines that a hearing on the Motion for 
Declaratory Judgment and the Motion for Rule 11 Sanction, which 
will shortly be ripe for decision, is appropriate to fiirther 
clarify the parties1 positions. The Court therefore schedules a 
hearing on April 16, 2000, at 2:00 p.m. to consider these Motions. 
Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda with 
respect to the remaining motions, the Court rules as stated herein. 
Since the Motions before the Court are related to concerns 
previously brought before Judge Hanson, this Court provides a brief 
procedural history of that case and its connection to the present 
case. In Chad Searle, the petitioner herein filed a Writ of 
Assistance seeking to enforce a May 22, 1993, Fort Peck Tribal 
Court custody Order that transferred custody from respondent Boyd 
Searle to the petitioner. The Petition essentially sought 
recognition of the May 22nd Order as a foreign judgment under the 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act. Judge Hanson denied the Petition on the 
basis that since respondent Boyd Searle was not given an 
opportunity to be heard at the May 22nc hearing, the Order was not 
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entitled to full faith and credit. (See Order of Dismissal, dated 
July 26, 1999) . 
In this case, the petitioner is attempting to enforce the 
Tribal Court's October 16, 1998, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree, finding that the respondents had "wrongfully 
maintained custody in contravention . . . of [the] Court's order of 
May 22, 1998." On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an Order 
entitled "Ennry of Judgment" which purported to give full faith and 
credit to the October 16th Decree. The respondents are now seeking 
to set aside the August 25th Order and the October 16"* Tribal 
Court Decree. 
The Court rules that the October 16"h Tribal Court Decree 
directly relates to and s-ems from an Order which another court has 
concluded to not be entitled to full faith and credit. 
Specifically, the Decree reinforces the May 22nd Order and 
reiterates that it "is hereby continued." The October 16th Decree 
is therefore flawed because it maintains custody of the minor child 
under an Order which was issued without: giving respondent Boyd 
Searle his due process rigirc to be heard. Accordingly, the October 
16th Order is similarly not entitled to full faith and credit. The 
Motion to Set Aside is therefore be granted in parr and this 
Court's August 25cn Judgment is set: aside. However, to the extent 
the Motion seeks to set aside the Decree itself, the Court 
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determines that it has no jurisdiction to make such a ruling. In 
other words, respondents' Motion essentially urges this Court to 
impermissibly act as an appellate court and review the propriety of 
another court's ruling and then "overturn" that ruling by setting 
it aside. Accordingly, the Motion to Set Aside is granted with 
respect to the August 25th "Judgment", but denied with respect to 
the October 16th Tribal Court Decree. As a corollary, since the 
Court sets aside the August 25::i Judgment, the Motion seeking to 
stay that Judgment is rendered moot. 
Counsel for the respondents is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Court's Ruling and submit the same to the Court for 
Review and sicrnature. 
Dated this (—"day of February, 2000. 
_M 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH i MAG £D 
JAYNISEARLE, 
Petitioner, . 
vs. 
BOYD SEARLE and 
DOROTHY SEARLE, 
Respondents. 
ORDER SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 99-690-7234 FJ 
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 Code of 
Judicial Administration for decision on Respondents' Emergency Motion for Stay 
Pending Rule 60 Motion, and Motion to Set Aside Judgment. The Court having reviewed 
In the Matter of Chad Searle, a Minor Indian Child, Case No. 98-090-5344, Judge 
Timothy Hanson presiding, having properly considered all the oral and written arguments 
submitted to the Court by the parties, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the 
Court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner Jayni Searle (hereafter "Petitioner") filed a petition for Writ of 
Assistance in Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 98-
noR^o 
090-5344, In the Matter of Chad Searle, A Minor Indian Child, seeking to enforce a May 
22,1998, Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order that transferred custody from Respondent 
Boyd Searle (hereafter "Respondent") to the Petitioner. The petition sought recognition 
of the May 22nd Order as a foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
2. Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the petition on the basis that since 
Respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the Order 
was not entitled to full faith and credit. 
3. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition before this Court to enforce an 
October 16, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Count Order's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree, finding that Respondents had "wrongfully maintained custody in 
contravention.. .of [the] Court's order of May 22, 1998." 
4. On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an Order entitled "Entry of 
Judgment" which purported to give full faith and credit to the October 16th Tribal Court 
Decree. 
5. Respondents filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Rule 60 Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment, and a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Respondents' motions 
sought to stay the August 25th Order and to set aside the August 25th Order and the 
October 16th Tribal Court Decree. 
6. A hearing was held before the Court on November 23, 1999, on the 
Emergency Motion for Stay, at which time the Court granted the motion temporarily but 
deferred making a final ruling on the Motion until counsel for Petitioner had an 
opportunity to respond to the Motion and the Court had an opportunity to review the case 
In the Matter of Chad Searle, a Minor Indian Child. 
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7. Petitioner subsequently filed a response in opposition to the motions and a 
Notice to Submit for Decision pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The October 16th Tribal Court Decree directly relates to and stems from an 
Order which another court in Chad Searle has concluded not to be entitled to full faith 
and credit. Specifically, the Decree reinforces the May 22nd Order and reiterates that it 
"is hereby continued." The October 16th Decree is therefore flawed because it maintains 
custody of the minor child under an Order which was issued without giving Respondent 
Boyd Searle his due process right to be heard. Accordingly, the October 16th Order is 
similarly not entitled to full faith and credit, and the August 25th Order must be set aside. 
2. The Court has no jurisdiction to review the propriety of the Fort Peck 
Tribal Court's ruling and then set aside or overturn that ruling as it pertains to the 
October 16th Tribal Court Decree. 
3. Since the Court sets aside the August 25th Judgment, the Motion seeking 
Stay of the Judgment is rendered moot. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. The August 25th Order is set aside and vacated, and shall not be enforced 
by the parties or law enforcement. 
DATED this _o!} day of C S / / T , 2000. 
O0R?2 
Approved as to form 
. ,011/s-ir^ 
BY THE COURT 
lonorable Leslie A.^ Lewis 
Third District Court Judge 
p 6n 
Jim C. Shirley 
onR9Q 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1$ day off-^^? 1999,1 caused to be served by mail 
true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Jim Shirley 
9 East Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax: 359-0181 
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The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Jayni Searle's Petition for 
Restoration of Custody. An entry of, notice of, and application for default having been entered 
for Respondent's failure to answer the Petition in a timely manner. An Affidavit of Residence 
and Grounds having been filed by Jayni Searle. The Court having reviewed the file and having 
made its decision, now enters the following. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Chad Searle is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to a ruling by 
Judge Stafne that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
2. Chad Searle is a native American child and a member or eligible for membership 
in the Fort Peck Assmibome and Sioux Tribes. 
3r Jayni Searle is a biological mother of Ctiad Searle. 
4. Temporary custody of Chad was awarded by the Court to Jayni Searle on May 
22, 1998. 
5. The emotional father of Chad Searle died in February of 1998. 
6. Since then, Boyd and Dorothy Searle have wrongfully maintained custody in 
contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) and this 
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Court's order of May 22, 1998. 
7. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are the emotional grandparents and currently have 
physical custody despite the Court's oinder. 
8. Boyd and Dorothy Searle have petitioned the court to dismiss the termination 
action pending in tribal court. See Attached exhibit #t . 
9. Jayni Searle is a person fit to assume custody on the afore-mentioned child. 
10. Jayni Searle and Chad Searle enjoy the relationship of mother and child. 
11. Jayni Searle and Chad Searle have a normal parent-child bond which has been 
drastically impacted by the emotional grandparents. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The matter is properly before the Court pursuant to tribal code. 
2. Jayni and Chad Searle are members or eligible for membership in the Fort Peck 
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes. 
3. Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation. 
4. Chad Searle, pursuant to law and tribal custom, became domiciled on the 
reservation due to the death of his physical custodian and emotional father, Boyd 
Carl Searle. 
5. Jayni Searle is a fit and appropriate person who should be awarded custody 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby 
enters the following: 
DECREE AND ORDER 
1. Chad Searle is hereby placed in the permanent custody, care, and control of 
Jayni Searle, his natural and biological mother. 
2. The previous order requiring transfer of Chad Searle to the reservation is hereby 
continued. 
3. Law enforcement is hereby directed to remove the child and retum him to the 
reservation. 
SIGNED THIS [(r navX>rrtoP 1998. 
JUDGE 
TRIBAL COURT JUDGI 
On this (In UL 
j^rrr-gertificate of Mailing 
.day ofv v J ,1998 I deposited in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Entry of Default to: Maria 
Santana, 2159 South 700 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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ADDENDA D 
FILED DISTRICT COURT ;; 
Third Judicial District '^ 
JAYNI SEARLE imm uuuiowi uiauiu -
 t| 
PROSE JUN 151SS3 i 2 31998 ; -
P.O. BOX 702 . • ! CO'*™ ,_, WOLF POINT, MONTANA 59g01 gtfWififfifflzj. 
Deputy GterfrClL 
-A 
FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES 
In the Matter of Chad Searle, ) ORDER RE: ORDER TO SHOW 
A Minor Indian Child, ) CAUSE 
Jayni Searle, ) Case No. ;Z^ 1 T 
Plaintiff. ) Judge f ^ T A ^ K l FT 
) 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on an Order to 
Show Cause on the 19tk Day of November, 1998. Present for the hearing was Jayni 
Searle. The Court notes that Boyd and Dorothy Searle were personally served with 
notice of the hearing and the Order to Show Cause by certified, return receipt, U.S. 
mail. The Court notes futher that counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina 
Santana, was served by certified, return receipt U.S. mail. The Court, having heard 
testimony from Jayni Searle and argument and having fully reviewed the file, enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Chad Searle is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
2. Jayni Searle is an Indian parent as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act 
3. Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation. 
4. Boyd Carl Searle was Chad Searle's emotional father, having been 
deemed so by his own admission in a divorce action in the Third District 
Court. 
5. On February 1998, Boyd Carl Searle died. 
6. Chad Searle was in the custody of his emotional father, Boyd Carl Searle, 
when the emotional father died. 
7. The emotional grandparents, Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Petition to 
ooor-5 
Terminate Parental Rights of Jayni Searle in the Third District Court in 
Salt Lake County for the State of Utah. 
8. On March 3rJ, 1998, Boyd and Dorothy Searle obtained temporary 
custody of Chad through order of the Third District Juvenile Court of 
Utah 
9. Boyd and Dorothy Searle also filed a Petition for Protective Order 
10. Subsequent to that order, Jayni Searle retained private counsel, Mr Jim 
C. Shirley of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
11. Mr. Shirley obtained a copy of the March 3rd, 1998 order He 
subsequently received copies of the other documents This transpired 
after the order of temporary custody was entered by the juvenile court 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle did not serve Jayni Searle or the Fort Peck 
Tribes with Notice prior to obtaining the temporary custody order in 
juvenile court or the protective order in district court 
12 The Petition for Protective Order was certified from Utah's Third District 
Court to Utah's Third District Juvenile Court 
13. Mr Shirley sent courtesy copies of the pleadings to Mr Gary Beaudry, 
counsel for the Fort Peck Tribes Prior to receipt of these courtesy copies, 
the tribe had not been notified of the proceedings as required by I C W A 
14 Ms Searle filed a Petition to transfer the proceedings to tribal court under 
25 U S C 1911 (b) in the juvenile court, alleging concurrent jurisdiction 
15 Ms Searle subsequently filed an Amended Petition to transfer under 25 
U S C 1911 (a) in the juvenile court, alleging exclusive jurisdiction 
16. Ms Searle filed a Petition to invalidate the improperly entered custody 
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order, citing to 25 U.S.C. 1914 and alleging violauuns of 1912(a,d,&e). 
17. Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Response to the Amended Petition to 
Transfer, alleging that domicile had not changed at the death of the 
emotional father and that Jayni Searle abandoned the child, Chad 
Searle. 
18. Ms. Searle filed a Reply which cited to case law which demonstrated 
that under common law domicile did change at the death of a custodian 
to the surviving natural parent and which alleged grounds to demonstrate 
that Ms. Searle had not abandoned the child. 
19. On May 15tk, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court, in and for the state 
of Utah issued an order transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court. 
20. On May 22n<L 1998, this Court found that it has exclusive jurisdiction and 
accepted jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court invalidated the previous 
order granting custody to Boyd and Dorothy Searle and ordered that the 
child be brought back to the reservation and placed in the temporary 
custody of the natural mother. 
21. On the 3rd Day of June, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court entered 
an order staying its May 15tk, 1998 order. 
22. On June 8th, 1998, the tribal and juvenile courts issues stays of the 
proceedings pending hearing before an appeals or federal court on the 
issue of whether the juvenile court had any jurisdiction to enter such 
an order. 
23. Ms. Searle caused to be filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals in and 
for Utah. 
24. On August 31st, 1998, counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle signed a 
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voluntary dismissal of the Petition to Terminate. 
25. On the 1 st Day of September, 1998, the Court of Appeals found that the 
Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction to enter any orders. 
26. On the 8th Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle filed a Petition for Sole 
Custody. 
27. Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Santana, was served with 
this Petition for Sole Custody. 
28. On the 9tk Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle filed a Stipulation to 
Dismiss Action Brought by Boyd and Dorothy Searle. 
29. On the 9th Day of September, 1998, the Court granted Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle's voluntary dismissal but specifically ordered that "the previous 
order of temporary custody entered by this Court on May 22nd, 1998, is 
hereby continued with Jayni Searle." 
30. Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served with the stipulation and 
the order. 
31. Jayni Searle subsequently filed an Notice of Entry of Default, Entry of 
Default, and Application for Entry of Default. All these documents were 
served on counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, 
by U.S. Mail. 
32. The Court entered a default and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Decree. The decree was served on counsel for Boyd and 
Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. Mail. 
33. Jayni Searle subsequently filed a Corrected Notice of Entry of Default. 
Corrected Entry of Default, and Corrected Application for Entry of Default 
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All these documents were served on counsel for uoyd and Dorothy 
Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. mail. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Chad Searle is an Indian Child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
2. The Court previously entered a finding and conclusion of exclusive 
jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) based upon the fact that upon the 
death of the custodian/emotional father, domicile of Chad Searle became 
that of his mother pursuant to tribal custom and well-established common 
law. The Court previously rejected Boyd and Dorothy Searle's con-
tentions as mefitiess. 
3. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the issues of custody and 
contempt before it. The Indian Child Welfare Act applies to the case at 
hand. Tribal court is the proper forum for any litigation involving the 
custody of an Indian child which is not the result of a divorce action or 
delinquency matter. The Court obtained jurisdiction originally due to the 
transfer of the litigation involving the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. 
At the time the Petition to Terminate Parental Right was withdrawn, the 
Court retained jurisdiction due to a pending Petition for Sole Custody filed 
by Jayni Searle which was filed prior to the stipulation allowing dismissal. 
The Court continues to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction. The Court has 
original jurisdiction over the custody matter involving Chad Searle due to 
the filing of the Petition for Sole Custody. Jurisdiction has never been 
terminated by the Court as contended by the emotional grandparents, 
nnnnf} 
Boyd and Durothy Searle. 
4. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Jayni Searle and Chad Searle as 
domiciliaries of the reservation pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
5. The court has personal jurisdiction over Boyd and Dorothy Searle that was 
acquired when litigation involving the termination of parental right action 
was transferred to Tribal Court. See 92 Corpus Juris Secundum, Venue 
SS 207 (the court receiving the transfer of jurisdiction/venue "thereby 
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter, all the parties 
thereto, and all matters incident thereto, and it may inquire into 
matters connected with the subject matter of the action"). 
6. Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction due to emotional grandparents 
voluntary filing of pleadings before the Court. The Rules of Tribal Pro-
cedure require that the party file a special and limited appearance if they 
do not wish to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the tribal court 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle failed to file any special and limited appearance 
as required. 
7. Jayni Searle having satisfied her burden by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that: 
a. Boyd arrcTDorothy Searle were served with a true and correct 
copy of the Order to Show Cause, 
b. Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully failed to comply 
with the Court's order to appear and produce the child; 
c. Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully failed to comply 
with the Court's May 22nd, 1998 order to surrender physical 
custody of the child, and 
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d. that Boyd and Dorothy Searle had the capacity to comply with the 
Court's orders. 
BASED upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
1. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are hereby held in contempt of Court; 
2. The Court will stay the jail time if and when Boyd and Dorothy Searle 
agree to bring Chad to the reservation as previously ordered; 
3. A bench warrant is issued for the immediate detention and transport 
of Boyd and Dorothy Searle to jail; 
4. The Court will lift the Bench Warrant if and when Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle contact the court, agree to return the child to the reservation, 
and make suitable arrangements for the transport of Chad^Searle to 
the reservation; 
5. A bench warrant is issued for the immediate detention and transport 
of Chad Searle to the reservation; 
6. The court will lift the Bench Warrant upon Chad Searle's return to the 
custody of his mother; 
7. Boyd and Dorothy Searle be required to reimburse the tribe for costs 
incurred in the Fort Peck Tribe's effort to secure the release and return 
of Chad Searle to the reservation; 
8. The Fort Peck Tribes are ordered to provide the Court with a specific 
amount; 
9. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are ordered to pay Jayni Searle for 
oooii 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred; and 
10. Jayni Searle is instructed to secure a list of attorneys fees 
incurred. 
DATED THIS A ^ ^ D A Y OF ^ D A Y O F i t f ^ V ^ l , 1998. 
FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 
JUDGE 
. • Certificate of Mailing 
On this Q ^ T day of {vQ\J , 1998 I deposited in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct signed copy of the foregoing Order Re: 
Order to Show Cause to: 
Maria Christina Santana 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE 
4906 South 4460 West 
Kearns, Utah 84118 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, 
Appellee. ] 
I Case No. 20000274-CA 
1 Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING 
•oOo-
ADDENDA E 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE, 
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD 
JAYNI SEARLE/ 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
v s . 
BOYD SEARLE, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. 980905344 
SALT LAK5 CCJNVY 
By. 
ucpury Car* 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 8, 
1999 for hearing on pe t i t i one r ' s Petition for Writ of Assistance. 
Jim C. Shirley appeared representing p e t i t i o n e r , Jayni Searle. 
Maria Cristina Santana appeared representing respondent, Boyd 
Searle. Boyd Searle personally appeared. The p a r t i e s have f i led 
extensive pleadings regarding the issues before the Court, the 
part ies made their respective arguments. The Court having reviewed 
the f i l e , having properly considered a l l the o ra l and writ ten 
arguments submitted to the Court by the p a r t i e s , the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
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SEARLE V. SEARLE PAGE TWO ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In February of 1998, respondent filed in the Third 
District Juvenile Court a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights 
of Jayni Searle in relation to Chad Searle. 
2. Subsequently, respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for 
Custody and obtained an Ex Parte Order of Temporary Custody on 
March 3, 1998. 
3. Petitioner filed a Petition to Transfer to Tribal Court 
in March of 1998. 
4. The Third District Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. 
Johansson, presiding, transferred jurisdiction over a pending 
Petition for Termination to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
5. The Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted jurisdiction and 
transferred custody of the minor child on May 22, 1998. 
6. Boyd Searle was not provided notice that the Fort Peck 
Tribal Court would issue an Order on the issue of custody. 
7. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with 
this Court seeking assistance of this Court in enforcing the May 
22, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order. 
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SEARLE V. SEARLE PAGE THREE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
8. The parties have subsequently filed numerous pleadings 
regarding the appropriateness of the issuance of a Writ of 
Assistance. 
9. Petitioner also subsequently filed a Motion to give Full 
Faith and Credit to two subsequent Tribal Court Orders. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The May 22, 1998 Order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court 
transferring custody from respondent to petitioner is a foreign 
j udgment. 
2. As a foreign judgment, the judgment must be filed in 
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann., 
Section 78-22a-l, et seq. 
3. The Petition for Writ of Assistance does not comply with 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
4. Petitioner was entitled to be heard at a hearing prior to 
the transfer of custody by the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
5. The failure to give respondent an opportunity to be heard 
at a hearing prior to transfer of custody constitutes a violation 
of respondent's due process rights. 
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SEARLE V. SEARLE PAGE FOUR ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
6. As such, the May 22, 1998 Order transferring custody is 
not entitled to full faith and credit. 
7. The subsequent Tribal Court Orders are not before the 
Court under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. The Petition for Writ of Assistance is denied. 
2. The action is dismissed with prejudice as to the Fort 
Peck Tribal Court May 22, 1998 Order. 
3. The above-entitled action is dismissed without prejudice 
as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 22, 1998 Order which 
has been entered by the Fort Peck Tribal Court and the dismissal of 
this action in no way precludes subsequent enforcement of 
subsequent Orders through a filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act, and which are otherwise enforceable under law. 
Dated this .day of July, 1999. 
/<s? _ 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Jayni Searle, ] 
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v. 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, ] 
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Case No. 20000274-CA 
Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING 
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ADDENDA F 
Wfc & Iubtctal ©fetrtrt Ct.rt 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State Street 
Timothy R. Hanson Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
District Judge 801-238-7515 
July 15, 1999 
vJim C. Shirley, Esq, 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Maria Cristina Santana, Esq. 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Jayni Searle v. Boyd Searle 
Case No. 980905344 
Dear Counsel: 
I have the request for decision in the above-referenced matter 
relating to the proper form of Order as a result of the hearing on 
March 8, 1999. 
I had anticipated a transcript prepared by one of the court 
reporters here at the District Court, and note that the transcript 
was prepared by personnel of Mr. Shirley's office by reviewing a 
videotape. I have no concerns that the transcript is not 
reasonably accurate, but it should be clear that it is not an 
official transcript. 
I have examined both the Orders submitted and am satisfied 
that Mr. Shirleyfs Order, with some modifications, is appropriate, 
and rather than ask Mr. Shirley to make those modifications, I have 
prepared an Order, a copy of which is enclosed, making the changes 
that I require. 
I was satisfied that the Findings of Fact in Mr. Shirley's 
proposed Order were appropriate, as well as the Conclusions of Law. 
The Order of Dismissal, however, was not complete and as you will 
note, includes now as paragraph 1, the statement that the Petition 
for Writ of Assistance is denied; paragraph 1, which is now 
numbered paragraph 2 is slightly modified to strike the words "the 
above-entitled", and insert the word "this"; and finally, on what 
was previously proposed paragraph 2 in the Order is now paragraph 
3 and contains after the words "Utah Foreign Judgment Act", the 
following: "and which are otherwise enforceable under law". 
00373 
Jim C. Shirley, Esq. 
Maria Cristina Santana, Esq. -2- July 15, 1999 
With those modifications, the Order is appropriate and I have 
signed the same, all on a date shown on your copy. 
With regard to the complaints of Ms. Santana that Mr. Shirley 
has brought this matter before Judge Lewis, please be advised that 
I do not find any impropriety in that regard, as it was my 
intention to only address the May 22, 1998 Order and the Writ of 
Assistance that was requested based thereon. 
If any subsequent Order has been properly domesticated under 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and is otherwise enforceable, I am 
confident that Judge Lewis, who apparently is assigned to the case, 
will handle the matter in accordance with the facts as she finds 
them and in accordance with the law. 
Accordingly, the informal request/for sanctions as contained 
in Ms. Santana1s letter of June 21,yl999 is refused. Hopefully, 
this Order that I have signed wil/ bring this case number to a 
conclusion. 
Timothy R. Hanson 
District Court Judge 
TRHrjsh 
Enclosure 
cc: Gary Beaudry, Esq. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, 
Appellee. ' 
) Case No. 20000274-CA 
I Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
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ADDENDA G 
JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100) 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ? .! T '3 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003 D O S ) ^ ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JAYNI SEARLE, } APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF 
} JUDGMENT 
Petitioner, } 
VS. } CASE NO. 996907234FJ 
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE. } 
Respondent. } JUDGE LESLI T.EWIS 
In accordance with U.C.A. § 78-22a-l et. seq. (1998 as amended), the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act, Jayni Searle, by and through counsel of record, hereby applies to this Court for entry 
of judgment based upon the following matters appearing of record: 
1. A Notice of Judgment was filed on the 15* Day of June, 1999 in accordance with the 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-2(2); 
2. An Affidavit was filed on the 15th Day of June, 1999 in accordance with the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-3(l); 
3. Thirty days have passed as required by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-
22a-3(3), prior to any process regarding the enforcement of the foreign judgment; 
4. Boyd and Dorothy Searle have failed to file a request for Stay as required by the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-4; 
5. Respondents have failed to raise any issue as to the October 16, 1998 order. 
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6. The order should now be given full faith and credit and "should be treated in all 
respects as a judgment of a district court of Utah" as set forth in the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-l(l &2); and 
7. An Entry of Judgment for each order was filed with this Application. 
Therefore, Petitioner hereby requests that the Court enter the foreign judgments for 
enforcement in Utah by issuing the two Entry of Judgment pleadings filed herewith. 
Dated This f ' Day of _ 
huc^j^C , 1999. 
Jim d. Shirley ^ M 
Attorney for Jayni Searle 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this / / ? day mlX10\US\ 19991 mailed, postage pre-paid First Class, a 
copy of the foregoing Application for Entry of Judgment to: 
Maria Christina Santana 
Santana Law Firm 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, 
Appellee. 
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Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING 
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ADDENDA H 
JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100) F ,4£ , ILD . I I T R , C T C 0 U R T 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF T h l r d J u d , c i a ' District 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400 Alir 9 1 MOO 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 I hJI A O p p | L 3 L S 3 
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003 f'V»/"\VJ? C U s^^K^VlffY?^7 
Oapyty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE. 
Respondent. 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 99S9Q7234FJ 
JUDGE LESLI LEWIS 
A Notice of Judgment was filed by Jayni Searle on the 15 Day 
of June, 1999 in the above-entitled court. The Judgment was 
entered by the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court on the 
16th Day of October, 1998. A review of the record indicates that 
the Notice of Judgment was served by Certified Mail by the Clerk of 
the Court on Boyd and Dorothy Searle at 4906 South 4460 West, 
Kearns, Utah 84118. Certified copies of the foreign judgments were 
filed with the Court. All appropriate documentation was filed as 
required by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Anno. § 78-
22a-l et. seg. 
one 63 
Respondents, Boyd and Dorothy Searle, filed a responsive 
pleading but failed to raise any issues which would prevent the 
entry of the October 16, 1998 order, all comments were directed at 
the November 23, 1998 order of contempt. Additionally, Boyd and 
Dorothy Searle have failed to file a request for Stay as required 
by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-4. The thirty 
day time period having lapsed and Respondents having failed to file 
a request for Stay as required by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, 
the Court hereby recognizes and gives full faith and credit to the 
October 16, 1998 order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court attached 
hereto. The attached order is hereby given full faith and credit, 
subject to all the enforcement provisions which govern such 
judgments. All county, local, and other peace officers and/or law 
enforcement personnel are hereby directed to give full faith and 
credit to the attached judgments. 
DATED THIS /""-? :_, 1999. 
-eiiERK OF THE COURT DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT 
<6 
•^ii'f-r.:. 
>\ 
OOPBH 
On this & 
CERTIFICATE OF MAFT JNG 
day ofiXUlhUfZA 19991 mailed, postage pre-paid First Class, a •umd. 
copy of the foregoing Unsigned Entry of Judgment to: 
Maria Christina Santana 
Santana Law Firm 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
C7f 
WJ^ 
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JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100) 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE. 
Respondent. 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 996907234FJ 
JUDGE LESLI LEWIS 
Exhibit #1 
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JAYNI SEARLE ij H 
PROSE !;! 
P.O. BOX 702 
WOLF POINT, MONTANA 59201 
1 
r-T I6B98 : b 
R ' l E 
i 
FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES 
In the Matter of Chad Searle, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Minor Indian Child, ) OF LAW, AND DECREE 
) Case No. 517 
Jayni Searle, 
) Judge ^ \)J\ JfoMG 
Plaintiff. ) V V — — -
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Jayni Searie's Petition for 
Restoration of Custody. An entry of, notice of, and application for default having been entered 
for Respondent's failure to answer the Petition in a timely manner. An Affidavit of Residence 
and Grounds having been filed by Jayni Searte. The Court having reviewed the file and having 
made its decision, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Chad Searle is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to a ruling by 
Judge Stafne that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
2. Chad Searle is a native American child and a member or eligible for membership 
in the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes. 
3. Jayni Searle is a biological mother of Chad Searle. 
4. Temporary custody of Chad was awarded by the Court to Jayni Searle on May 
22, 1998. 
5. The emotional father of Chad Searle died in February of 1998. 
6. Since then, Boyd and Dorothy Searle have wrongfully maintained custody in 
contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) and this 
00 
Court's order of May 22, 1998. 
7. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are the emotional grandparents and currently have 
physical custody despite the Court's order. 
8. Boyd and Dorothy Searle have petitioned the court to dismiss the termination 
action pending in tribal court. See Attached exhibit #1. 
9. Jayni Searle is a person fit to assume custody on the afore-mentioned child. 
10. Jayni Searle and Chad Searle enjoy the relationship of mother and child. 
11. Jayni Searle and Chad Searle have a normal parent-child bond which has been 
drastically impacted by the emotional grandparents. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The matter is properly before the Court pursuant to tribal code. 
2. Jayni and Chad Searle are members or eligible for membership in the Fort Peck 
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes. 
3. Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation. 
4. Chad Searle, pursuant to law and tribal custom, became domiciled on the 
reservation due to the death of his physical custodian and emotional father, Boyd 
Carl Searle. 
5. Jayni Searle is a fit and appropriate person who should be awarded custody 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby 
enters the following: 
DECREE AND ORDER 
1. Chad Searle is hereby placed in the permanent custody, care, and control of 
Jayni Searle, his natural and biological mother. 
2. The previous order requiring transfer of Chad Searle to the reservation is hereby 
continued. 
3. Law enforcement is hereby directed to remove the child and return him to the 
reservation. 
SIGNED THIS [ l r Dav ofV T H H L H P - i c . . 1998. 
JUDGE 
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FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, 
Appellee. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
vs. 
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE. 
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
CASE NO * ? * ? ^ a * T 3 g > ^ FT 
Judge LCcOl S 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT JUDGMENTS DATED OCTOBER 16, 1998 AND 
NOVEMBER 23, 1998 FILED IN THE FORT PECK ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX 
TRIBAL COURT HAS BEEN FILED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH UNDER' THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT 
ACT (UCA 78-22a-1) . THIS JUDGMENT HAS THE SAME LEGAL FORCE AND 
EFFECT AS A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY A UTAH STATE COURT. 
x^e H. mq 
DATE 
NAME & P.O./ADDRESS OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR: 
JAYNI SEARLE 
P.O. BOX 702 
WOLF POINT, MONTANA 59201 
NAME & P.O./ADDRESS OF CREDITOR'S ATTORNEY: 
JIM C. SHIRLEY 
LAHERTY AND ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 4 00 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SUSArJ L. SurJO&gfZG (COURT CLERK) , BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
UPON OATH STATES THAT HE/SHE HAS MAILED A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF 
0001 
JUDGMENT WITH THE ATTACHED ORDERS TO THE JUDGMENT DEBTORS, BOYD AND 
DOROTHY SEARLE, AT 4906 SOUTH 4460 WEST, KEARNS, UTAH 84118. 
THIS Ig DAY OF Q^Hje. 1999. 
DEPUTY CLERK 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, ] 
Appellant, 
v . •" 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, 
Appellee. 
) Case No. 20000274-CA 
Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE. 
Respondents. 
• NOTICE OF APPEAL 
• CASE NO. 99S907234FJ 
• JUDGE T.EST.T T.KWTS 
Comes now Petitioner, Jayni Searle, by and through counsel, Jim C. Shirley of Laherty & 
Associates, P.C, and hereby enters this Notice of Appeal. Petitioner appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals the February 25, 2000, Order Setting Aside Judgment issued by the Third District Court, 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis presiding. Attached hereto as Exhibit #1. 
DATED THIS _ 2 _ day of l/^rcU
 f 2000. 
J I M a S H I R f ^ y 
Attorney for Jayni Searle 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this / 7 day of //[fircll^ , 2000,1 mailed, postage pre-paid First Class, 
a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to: 
Maria Christina Santana 
Santana Law Firm 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2t5gLSorth 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106-
Que r csi/ct c( A^ u r 9c//oI 
-EXHIBIT #7-
00628 
Maria Cristina Santana (7300) FILED DISTRICT COURT 
SANTANA LAW FIRM T W r d Judicial District 
44 West Broadway, Suite 304 , 
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84101 FEB O dWI 
- •winy 
Deputy 
y,
Telephone: (801) 363-5803 
BV i i i C I Y vi i / » 
• t  Clark 
Attorney for Respondents 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAYNISEARLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOYD SEARLE and 
DOROTHY SEARLE, 
Respondents. 
ORDER SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 99-690-7234 FJ 
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 Code of 
Judicial Administration for decision on Respondents' Emergency Motion for Stay 
Pending Rule 60 Motion, and Motion to Set Aside Judgment The Court having reviewed 
In the Matter of Chad Searle. a Minor Indian Child Case No. 98-090-5344, Judge 
Timothy Hanson presiding, having properly considered all the oral and written arguments 
submitted to the Court by the parties, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the 
Court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner Jayni Searle (hereafter "Petitioner") filed a petition for Writ of 
Assistance in Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 98-
090-5344, In the Matter of Chad Searle. A Minor Indian Child seeking to enforce a May 
22,1998, Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order that transferred custody from Respondent 
Boyd Searle (hereafter "Respondent") to the Petitioner. The petition sought recognition 
of the May 22nd Order as a foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
2. Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the petition on the basis that since 
Respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the Order 
was not entitled to full faith and credit 
3. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition before this Court to enforce an 
October 16, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court Order's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree, finding that Respondents had ''wrongfully maintained custody in 
contravention...of [the] Court's order of May 22,1998." 
4. On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an Order entitled "Entry of 
Judgment" which purported to give full faith and credit to the October 16th Tribal Court 
Decree. 
5. Respondents filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Rule 60 Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment, and a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Respondents' motions 
sought to stay the August 25th Order and to set aside the August 25th Order and the 
October 16th Tribal Court Decree. 
6. A hearing" was held before the Court on November 23, 1999, on the 
Emergency Motion for Stay, at which time the Court granted the motion temporarily but 
deferred making a final ruling on the Motion until counsel for Petitioner had an 
opportunity to respond to the Motion and the Court had an opportunity to review the case 
In the Matter of Chad Searle. a Minor Indian Child. 
7. Petitioner subsequently filed a response in opposition to the motions and a 
Notice to Submit for Decision pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The October 16th Tribal Court Decree directly relates to and stems from an 
Order which another court in Chad Searle has concluded not to be entitled to full faith 
and credit Specifically, the Decree reinforces the May 22nd Order and reiterates that it 
"is hereby continued." The October 16th Decree is therefore flawed because it maintains 
custody of the minor child under an Order which was issued without giving Respondent 
Boyd Searle his due process right to be heard. Accordingly, the October 16th Order is 
similarly not entitled to full faith and credit, and the August 25th Order must be set aside. 
2. The Court has no jurisdiction to review the propriety of the Fort Peck 
Tribal Court's ruling and then set aside or overturn that ruling as it pertains to the 
October 16th Tribal Court Decree. 
3. Since the Court sets aside the August 25th Judgment, the Motion seeking 
Stay of the Judgment is rendered moot 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. The August 25th Order is set aside and vacated, and shall not be enforced 
by the parties or law enforcement. 
DATED this _ ^ d a y of _ £ > ^ L _ , 2000. 
Oj^^t) ,1^ 
BY THE COURT 
lonOTable Leslie ASLewis 
i District Court Judge 
Approved as to form 
Jim C. Shirley 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this fl/ day o ip^^ 1999,1 caused to be served by mail 
true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Jim Shirley 
9 East Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax: 359-0181 
